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For many years, the debate over corporate ownershipand control has been in
a rut. At least since Berle and Mean's (1932) influential work, the debate has
centered aroundthe percentage of corporations that are owned and controlled
by families vs. the percentage that are controlled by independentmanagers.
Some researchers have devoted their careers to ferretting out new, hidden informationwhich the most recent study has missed. Great significance has been
given to a study which might find, for example, that 25 percent of the corporations are family-owned,rather than 38percent. Jack Niemonen'scritique of our
article, of course, is in that tradition.
During this long debate, however, few social scientists have recognized that
the subject matter has been changing. The simple categories of "family control" and "managerial control"are no longer adequate. Since 1932,we find the
emergence of powerfulinstitutionalinvestors. As we noted in our work, over40
percent of all corporatestock in the United States today is controlledby. institutional
investors.In some capitalist nations, this trend has gone even further. For example, in Japan, it is estimated that almost 70 percent of the corporate stock
is controlledby institutionalinvestors (Wallich and Wallich, 1976). (This trend
in Japan was hastened by MacArthur'sforced breakupof the old zaibatsu,the
pre-WorldWar II upper-class families that controlled major corporations (see
Halliday, 1975; Reischauer, 1977).
Mostimportant,our work is a beginningattempt to understandthis new structure. As our article clearly indicated,we have many unansweredquestions pertaining to institutional investors' place in the structure of corporate power.
Predictably, however, Niemonen's critique has questioned the data indicating
the reality of this new corporate structure. Thus, for the most part, we must
respondon this level. In doing so, we take each of Niemonen's main points (the
first three) in the order they were presented. We do this not because we agree
with the order of their importance, but because we hope to make it easy for the
reader to compare what we and Niemonen have written.
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